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Ulster's Defence Tradition
- part 3 -

By Robert K. Campbell
New Ulster, Spring, 1993

The USC's last call to action came with the degeneration of the 'Civil Rights' protests of late 1968 into an insurrection against Stormont. Just as the original protests were inspired by the Civil Rights campaign in the United States, so the new insurrectionary strategy was inspired by the later, violent, street protests and riots in America and Europe, most notably the May 1968 riots and strikes in France which almost brought down President de Gaulle. This new crisis took the government by surprise. The degree of official unpreparedness can be illustrated by the fact that it had been announced in June 1968 that, as an economy measure, the establishment of the USC was to be cut by a third, from 12,542 to 8,285! When the insurrection began in 1969, the USC numbered 8,579, of which 100 were regulars. Well trained in anti-errorist-and border guard tactics, the 'B' men, with the exception of the always distinct Belfast City division, had almost no training in police duties or riot control, nor were they equipped for these tasks. Thus they were initially employed to relieve the overstretched RUC, by manning police barracks, guarding key-points and so on. However, with the excessive strain on the RUC, the USC found itself having to participate in crowd control duties. On several occasions, USC patrols came under attack and had to fire warning shots. On two occasions Specials unjustifiably - in the view of the Scarman Tribunal - fired into crowds, killing one man and wounding five. All this was accompanied by a most vicious and intense Irish propaganda campaign against the USC, the RUC and Stormont, which was repeated and amplified by the British media, for this was the height of the 1960s, that decade of good music, mediocre politics and distorted values. 'Swinging England' saw Stormont, the USC and the Ulster Protestant people as backward and reactionary. Westminster forced the disbandment of the USC in early 1970. On disbandment, the 'B' men - who had always kept their arms at home (except in Belfast) - handed in all their weapons; not one went astray. This fact alone serves to disprove the propaganda that they were an un- disciplined Orange mob. In many ways, these terrible days were the USC's fines hour despite everything, they maintained discipline and exercised restraint to the end; their lapses from these standards were minor in comparison to those that befell the British army in later years, most notably 'Bloody Sunday' in Londonderry during l972.'~

Had Stormont been sovereign, there is no doubt that the crisis could have been dealt with, but it would have required the calling up to full-time duty of all the Specials, to deter or defend against Irish aggression and the use of a degree of lethal force on the streets. However, Stormont was not sovereign and lacked the resources to contain the violence in a non-lethal manner and so had to call on the British army for help.

This marked the beginning of the end of Stormont's control of the security forces and once Stormont lost such control, it largely became irrelevant. Finally, in 1972, it was suspended. The history of Stormont has taught two clear lessons: a parliament without the power of meaningful taxation is not worth having and a parliament without sovereignty is a guarantee of nothing.

The disbandment of the USC did not mark a break in Ulster's militia tradition, for a new force, under the control of the British army, was immediately raised. This was the Ulster Defence Regiment, intended solely for security duties in Ulster. The UDR developed rapidly. Originally it numbered seven battalions, one for each County and the City of Belfast. By late 1972 it had expanded to eleven battalions. The full list was 1st (County Antrim); 2nd (County Armagh); 3rd (County Down); 4th (County Fermanagh) 5th (County Londondeiry); 6th (County Tyrone); 7th (City of Belfast); 8th (County Tyrone); 9th (County An trim); 10th (City of Belfast) and 11th (Craigavon) battalions.

Regimental headquarters was at Lisburn and peak strength was 9,000 men. In 1973, women were recruited for the first time and soon became nicknamed 'Greenfinches'. All seeking to join the UDR were subject to independent security screening by the army before being accepted. In 1984, the number of battalions was reduced to nine, the two Antrim and two Belfast battalions being merged into one each: the lst/9th (County Antrim) and the 7th/lOth (City of Belfast). Originally composed of part-timers with a small regular cadre, the UDR changed its nature over the years and at the end, was composed of locally recruited regulars and part-timers in a roughly 50:50 ratio. Over 40,000 individuals served with the UDR during its existence. A minuscule faction of this total were convicted of criminal activities: 17 for murder and 121 for other serious offences. Even so, these totals are significantly higher than equivalent figures of the USC. However, because the UDR was controlled from Westminster, the British Government has firmly defended the record of the UDR which was overwhelmingly, one of courage, restraint and self-sacrifice. 16

In 1992, as part of post-Cold War defence cuts and a radical restructuirng of the British army, the UDR was merged with the Royal Irish Rangers, to form the Royal Irish Regiment. The new Regiment is divided into two elements: an all-regular battalion, for service all over the world, in a conventional role and seven mixed regular/pan-time security battalions for Ulster. This latest development thus marks a joining of two main strands of Ulster's military history.

Footnotes
1. Stewart, A. 1.0., The Narrow Ground pp.45-6, 50-2;
Johnstone, Robert, Belfast pp. 42-3;
Macrury. Patrick. The Siege ofDerrr pp.91-3.
Captain Lawrenson isquoted byjohnstone, pp.42-3.
2. Macrory. The Seig' eofDerry, p.93.
3. ibid pp.95-8
4. Mactory, The Siege of Derry, pp. 143-76; see also Miller, Derek., Still Under Siege, pp.27-36.
5. Macrory, The Siege ofDerry, pp.160,201-2.
6. ibid pp.247, 313-7; see also Lucy, Gordon., (ed)., LordMacaulayon Londonderry Aughrim,
Enniskillen & the Boyne, pp.56-62.
7. Ellis, Peter Beresford.. The Boyne Water, especially pp.107-9.
B. Lucy, (ed.), Lord Macaulay on Londonderry, Aughrum, Enniskillen & the Boyne. p.32.
9. Beckett, J. c., A Short History of Ireland pp. 770-3; Stewart,
A.T.Q., The Narrow Ground pp. 128-37;
Sir Ralph Abercromby quoted in Paul Fregosi, Dreams of Empire, p.132.
10. Hume, David For Ulster and Her Freedom, pp. 18-20,26 36
Orr Philip., The Road to the Somme pp 3 34 Stewart,
A. T. Q., The Ulster Crisis, pp 69 78 196-212.
11. Hezlet, Sir Arthur, The 'B'Specials, pp.1-120;
Kennedy Dennis The Widening Gulf pp.71-89,194 202
Harkness, David., Northern Ireland Since 1920 pp 121
Campbell,Robert K.. The Ulster-Irish War 1922 ' O'KelIy quoted by Kennedy pp 1989
12. Hezlet. The 'B'Specials'pp. 138-62;
Barton, Brian., Brookeborough, pp. 156-7;
Gibson-Harries, Derrick., Life-Line to Freedom, pp.1 -
13 Hezlet, The 'B'Specials, ilibid pp.244-S; see
15; Ryder, Chris., The RUC, pp.74-9.

End of article

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